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 SPEECH OF ME. LINCOLN,

AT A POLETICfiL DISGUSSIGN‘,

IN THE HALL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER, 1839

AT SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS.

FELLOW CITIZENS :——It is peculiarly embarrassing to me to attempt a continuance of
the discussion, on this evening, which has been conducted in this Hall on several pre-
ceding ones. It is so, because on each of those evenings, there was a much fuller at~
tendanee than now, without any reason for its being so, except the greater interest the
community feel in the Speakers who addressed them Men. than they do in him who is
to do so now. I am, indeed, apprehensive, that the few who have attended. have done
so, more to spare me of mortification, than in the hope of being interested in any thing I
may be able to say. This circumstance casts a damp upon my spirits, which I am sure
I shall be unable to overcome during the evening. But enough of preface.

The subject heretofore, and now to be discussed, is the Sub—Treasury scheme of
the present Administration, as a means of collecting, safe—keeping, transferring and dis-
bursing the revenues of the Nation, as contrasted with a National Bank for the same
purposes. Mr. Douglass has said that we (the Whigs), have not dared to meet them (the
Locos), in argument on this question. I protest against this assertion. I assert that
we have again and again, during this discussion, urged facts and arguments against
the Sub—Treasury, which they have neither dared to deny nor attempted to answer. But
lest some may be led to believe that we really wish to avoid the question, I now pro—
pose, in my humble way, to urge those arguments again; at the same time, begging
the audience to mark well the positions I shall take, and the proof I shall ofl'er to sus-
tain them, and that they will not again permit Mr. Douglass or his friends, to escape
the force of them, by a round and groundless assertion, that we “ dare not meet them
in argument.”

Of the Sub—Treasury then, as contrasted with a National Bank, for the before
enumerated purposes, I lay down the following propositions, to wit:

1st. It will injuriously affect the community by its operation on the circulating
medium.

2d. It will be a more expensive fiscal agent.

3d. It will be a less secure depository of the public money.

To show the truth of the first preposition, let us take a short review of our con-
dition under the operation of a National Bank. It was the depository of the public
revenues. Between the collection of those revenues and the disbursements of them by
the government, the Bank was permitted to, and did actually loan them out to indi-
viduals, and hence the large amount of money annually collected for revenue purposes,
which by any other plan would have been idle a great portion of time, was kept
almost constantly in circulation. Any person who will reflect, that money is only valu-
able while in circulation, will readily perceive, that any device which will keep the gov-
ernment revenues, in constant circulation, instead of being locked up in idleness, is no
inconsiderable advantage.

By the Sub-Treasury, the revenue is to be collected, and kept in iron boxes until
the government wants it for disbursement; thus robbing the people of the use of it,
while the government does not itself need it, and while the money is performing no
nobler office than that of rusting in iron boxes. The natural effect of this change of
policy, every one will see, is to reduce the quantity of money in circulation.

 

 2

But again, by the Sub‘Treasury scheme the revenue is to be collected in specie. I
antic1pate that this will be disputed. I expect to hear it said, that it is not the policy
of the Administration to collect the revenue in specie. If it shall, I reply, that Mr. Van
Buren, in his message recommending the Sub-Treasury, expended nearly a column of
that document in an attempt to persuade Congress to provide for the collection of the
revenue in specie exclusively; and he concludes with these words. “It may be safely
assuii‘icd, that no motive of convenience to the ciliaen, requires the reception of Bank
paper." In addition to this, Mr. Silas \Vriglit, Senator from New York, and the politi-
cal, personal and confidential friend of Mr. Van Buren, drafted and introduced into the
Senate the first.Sub—Treasury Bill, and that bill provided for ultimately collecting the
revenue in specie. It is true, I know, that that clause was stricken from the bill but it
was done by the votes of the Whigs, aided by a portion only of the Van Buren, Sena
tors. No Sub-Treasury bill has yet become a law, though two or three have been con-
sidered by Congress, some with and some without the specie clause; so that I admit
there is room for quibbling upon the question of whether the administration favor the
exclus1ve specie doctrine or not; but I take it, that the fact that the President at first
urged the speCie doctrine, and that under his recommendation the first bill introduced
embraced it, warrants us in charging it as the policy of the party, until their head as
publicly rocaiits it, as he at lirst espoused it——I repeat then, that by the Sub—Treasury
the revenue is to be collected in specie. Now mark what the effect of this must be By,‘
all estnnates ever made, there are but between 60 and 80 millions of specie iii the
United States. The expenditures of the Government for the year 1838, the last for
which we have had the report, were 40 millions. Thus it is seen, that if the whole
rcvennebc collected in specie, it will take more than half of all the specie in the nation
to do It: . By this means more than half of all the specie belonrring to the
fifteen million of souls, who compose the whole population of the countiiy is thrown
into the hands of the public office-holders, and other public creditors, coinposinrr in
number, perhaps not more than one-quarter of a million; leaving the other fourteen
millions and three-quarters to get along as they best can, with less than one-half of the
specie of the. country, and whatever rags and shin—plasters they may be able to put
and keep, in Circulation. By this means, every office-holder, and other public creditor,
may, and most likely will, set up shaver; and a most glorious harvest will the s ecie
men have of it ; each specie man, upon a fair division, having to his share the fiefcin
of about 50 rag men. —* In all candor, let me ask, was such a system fbr benefiting
the few at the expense of the many, ever before devised? And was the sacred name oil?
Dempi-Ai'acy, ever before made to endorse such an enormity against the rin‘hts of the
peep c . C

I have already said that the Sub—Treasur i will reduce the uantit ' ' ' '
culatiini. . This position is strengthened byDthe recollection, (that tho: fifvghleeirs 1tnocllie
collected in specie, so that the mere amount of revenue is not all that is withdrawn
but the aniount'of paper circulation that the 40 millions would serve as a basis tb is:
w1tlidrawii_: which would be in a sound state at least 100 millions. \Vhen 100 millidns
or more, of the circulation we now have, shall be withdrawn, who can contem )late’
Without terror, the distress, ruin, bankruptcy and beggary, that must follow. 1 L ,

y-luqilll‘ill):'li'ilxlll\l\\lilllill‘|l3‘llllllnl llii Sell-lie“; the United Males qlmllnc’ is [hit it mini-[ably commands ii prmizi’um of (1210 [0
1A‘TIIKV‘VAIII‘I'4I . 'lllr In” i‘iSuIn lilon, town! :H _ (ll/Yolk”:(THU/1M. livery yi-ur Ulll‘ Senator and ten citizens
m “mlnmmi‘um dill ltihhvgl; it‘l) oi thi-~ l ri-usnry pe dirueleil are :ippouitrd to transact the whole. of th- fill'luci‘ll cniicerif

. - .i- in e any iiiliu'niiluoii Ii‘ IllllY re- both as P) revel it 4 l l' l ‘ l l ‘ ’
WM” han- i-i-i-i-iri-il in “My“! ‘0 “h “Ml ‘ > ., .1 i 1 .iiii \ is iuisiiiieni of llll‘ funds ill/LICIL is
‘ . . - 0 ol |(\lll‘i'lllll' «luau/s in we]: 'iiil " i' “ l‘ ' ' ‘ '
lii'i'lilll" “HI ilislnn-ving WIN“. “mm“; 1 , ‘ . _ n3 ,. . ~ . .. i l>t\i‘l) i.i_\ doposdudinlliehunk to the
,,. .. , i. ii ioieiUii countries . (‘l'rilll oi the -lniii - . ' " l ' ' ‘ 'l
“1M“. ‘mg i-uiulnlimi ”I“ wwflvu. ’ - ,p . i. (11) , 111k on living paid out tliecitizeii to
. . y iiiiiiiiiiilili'ated in llll' whosedi-p'irlniei t tl - ' ' - ‘
S. :i- : . .» . . _. .- ., , . _ - i ll 1i.i_\iiii nt belongs must :1 i i -a ‘ 1". -
“my: llll' [littIlin ilii. tolluwiniz l\l1.H.l iiniii \\_liii'|i_, eluirl)‘ :illi' Will! the checkin- ()l‘il ,slzitin” illetlllltlllllll'lllid 1til will?)
.“L‘ih I: .li“| i-“iu :itixoii ll)! illl;l‘l‘\‘)i‘l|llli‘lll spear, \ville-ilali- to he paid. The person l‘ci'i‘iviiiici‘ verv si-liloiii l'Ltp‘) tlili-i
x a in: | 1' l'l'l'lli'Y or ii-ol im- 1i! di-N ‘Illd'llli'l'l't‘l'l‘lli‘tl IIlUllL“ " i ' ‘ ‘n i i x“ i
‘ . . . . . i ll Iii/inn f0 ilivmw ir [fl i ~ '
one lUl' llll' penple' 'ird that the chin lioldiV i l I; I i l] l l. l I a ”W“! [I (MUN/vi at a
. . . . . . - ‘l.\ and other piib— premium and MI" ‘ ' ' i 'h
. . ,. ,- , ' . . ' . ,. . \lll"(!lll('l conizitzidiscount 0f" ‘
Lilluinlii‘lilllil . \\ ill tuiii shah-is upon :ill the rest 01 the coin- is :i great variety and too large amount coiistziiillv\iiiIIIfiHiliith
lion and on wh‘i-li ii 1 ' ‘ l" ' 4 ‘ l i ' I -
ltr- . ~ .7 .. ' ‘ . . .. r . .. ,. i i iisiaily i.i,iiieiit [41‘ losses m i
will“: ‘Illllil‘ls‘lli:,;tl‘ul flUlIl ilii [thi i, lii mg .111 iii ii that relates those, who have payiiieiils to iiliaikc to tho Governdigiii’t‘l‘lfliii-l;l
N ”Hwy 0”“)er 1W” {fillitl’llllllltzl/ changers (plain. for Hamburg currency. which
h Tm mmmm ”MM“ of mlmhur” N...” i'- .. .“ .. C tili'iphit 11H i-inisiaiii iiiotion; filll'lllyiilli-Viilt muslin-nil}:occurs
\‘i'l'_\ simple. as i .l_\’ he supposed. i‘i'oiii sil ‘Illl‘ll ii territiirv 'll'llli rellli'iillilh'ililiiiIf all. l“lulcll mltl labelled With the amount,
“In!“ wliulwiiimnni “f ”1mm”. 1" ‘ . . .- 7. . ‘ ' . L: o \l‘ iziii ' wi iout bi‘lll“‘()1)l‘ll€kl
. . Ulll‘lll \ ‘ .‘i ‘ l l "' "‘ " ‘ . h h
and :i half millions of iinirlis riii‘i‘iilil 01" mill-hillIlliliiillliiilltliiiiil . “1th ll“ at llbplhl‘ your Olmm‘m servant,
.» , . .. ~, . _ ..r —17. ,..
‘11.;1illllll‘lulll}'l\‘0ll)\‘ll>.lll(l ii\e hundred dollars: and ex» “ To the Hun IFVI Woonuiiv “)H) LUIHBERL”
-., i . ... »'....'.. ‘1‘
:51}. I lI/llli cHr [\rl l) l.\ll..t)lil.lll i iii ll'lllfllluli'l‘s, net murr (him “ Si-ervlarv of the ’l'rcusiirv W'is‘iiiir't D C ”
i! lill n. uniimn! is in ciri-nziirmn. and all duties, taxes, This letter is foiiiid in Senate 15d iiiii tn '0“, " .
uni l\(l:i1', must he paid in lliiiiiliurg curreiii'y. I'ln' muse. Session of 1333339 (1 [Lu ,Imge 113' Of the

 

3

The man who has purchased any article, say a. horse, on credit, at 100 dollars, when
there are 200 millions circulating in the country, if the q'nantity be reduced to 100 mil-
lions by the arrival of pay—day, will find the horse but sufficient to pay half the debt ;
and the other half must either be paid out of his other means, and thereby become a
clear loss to him ; or go unpaid, and thereby become a clear loss to his Creditor. What
I have here said of a single case of the purchase of a horse, will hold good in every case
of a debt existing at the time a reduction in the quantity of money occurs, by wliomso-
ever, and for whatsoever it may have been contracted. It may be said, that what the
debtor loses, the creditor gains by this operation ; but on examination this will be found
true only to a very limited extent. It is more generally true that all lose by it. The
creditor, by losing more of his debts, than he gains by the increased value of those he
collects; the debtor by either parting with more of his property to pay his debts, than
he received in contracting them ; or, by entirely breaking up in his business, and thereby
being thrown upon the world in idleness.

The general distress thus created, will, to be sure, be temporary, because whatever
change may occur in the quantity of money in any community, time will adjust the
derangement produced; but while that adjustment is progressing, all suffer more or
less, and very many lose every thing that renders life desirable. \Vhy, then, shall we
suffer a severe difficulty, even though it be but temporary, unless we receive some equiv-
alent for it?

\Vhat I have been saying as to the effect produced by a reduction of the quantity
of money, relates to the whole country. I now propose to show that it would produce
a peculiar and permanent hardship upon the citizens of those States and Territories in
which the public lands lie. The’ Land Offices in those States and Territories, as all
know, form the great gulf by which all, or nearly all, the money in them, is swallowed
up. When the quantity of money shall be reduced, and consequently every thing under
individual control brought down in proportion, the price of those lands, being fixed by
law, will remain as now. Of necessity, it will follow that the produce or labor that now
raises money sufficient to purchase 80 acres, will then raise but sufficient to purchase
40, or perhaps not that much. And this difficulty and hardship will last as long, in
some degree, as any portion of these lands shall remain undisposed of. Knowing, as I
well do, the difficulty that poor people now encounter in procuring homes, I hesitate
not to say, that when the price of the public lands shall be doubled or trebled; or,
which is the same thing, produce and labor cut down to one—half or one-third of their
present prices, it will be little less than impossible for them to procure those homes
at all.

In answer to what I have said as to the effect the Sub—Treasury would have upon
the currency, it is often urged that the money collected for revenue purposes will not
lie idle in the vaults of the Treasury; and, farther, that a National Bank produces
greater derangement in the currency, by a system of contractions and expansions, than
the Sub-Treasury would produce in any way. In reply, I need only show, that expe—
rience proves the contrary of both these propositions. It is an undisputed fact, that
the late Bank of the United States, paid the Government $75,000 annually, for the
privilege of using the public money between the times of its collection and disburse-
ment. Can any man suppose, that the Bank would have paid this sum, annually for
twenty years, and then olfered to renew its obligations to do so, if in reality there was
no time intervening between the collection and disbursement of the revenue, and con-
sequently no privilege of using the money extended to it ‘2

Again, as to the contractions and expansions of a National Bank, I need only point
to the period intervening between the time that the late Bank got into successful oper-
ation and that at which the Government commenced war upon it, to show that during
that period, no such contractions or expansions took place. If before, or after that
period, derangement occurred in the currency, it proves nothing. The Bank could not
be expected to regulate the currency, either before it got into successful operation, or
after it was crippled and thrown into death convulsions, by the removal of the deposits
from it, and other hostile measures of the Government against it. We do not pretend,
that a National Bank can establish and maintain a. sound and uniform state of currency
in the country, in spite of the National Government; but we do say, that it has estab-
lished and maintained such a currency, and can do so again, by the aid of that Govern
ment; and we further say, that no duty is more imperative on that Government, than
the duty it owes the people, of furnishing them a sound and uniform currency.

 

 4

I now leave the proposition as to the effect of the Sub-Treasury upon the currency
of the country, and pass to that relative to the additional expense which must be incurred
by it over that incurred by a National Bank, as a fiscal agent of the Government. By
the late National Bank, we had the public revenue received, safely kept, transferred and
disbursed, not only without expense, but we actually received of the Bank $75,000
annually for its privileges, while rendering us those services. By the Sub-Treasury,
according to the estimate of the Secretary of the Treasury, who is the warm advocate
of the system and which estimate is the lowest made by any one, the same services are
to cost $60,000. Mr. Rives, who, to say the least, is equally talented and honest, esti-
mates that these services, under the Sub-Treasury system, cannot cost less than $600,000.
For the sake of liberality, let us suppose that the estimates of the Secretary and Mr.
Rives, are the two extremes, and that their mean is about the true estimate, and we
shall then find, that when to that sum is added the $75,000, which the Bank paid us,
the difference between the two systems, in favor of the Bank, and against the Sub-
Trcasury, is $405,000 a year. This sum, though small when compared to the many

millions annually expended by the General Government, is, when viewed by itself, very '

large; and much too large, when viewed in any light, to be thrown away once a year
for nothing. It is sufficient to pay the pensions of more than 4,000 Revolutionary Sol-
diers, or to purchase a 40 acre tract of Government land, for each one of more than
8,000 poor families.

To the argument against the Sub-Treasury, on the score of additional expense, its
friends, so far as I know, attempt no answer. They choose, so far as I can learn, to
treat the throwing away $405,000 once a year, as a matter entirely too small to merit
their democratic notice.

I now come to the proposition, that it would be less secure than a National Bank, as
a depository of the public money. The experience of the past, I think, proves the truth
of this. And here, inasmuch as I rely chiefly upon experience to establish it, let me
ask, how is it that we know any thing—that any event will occur, that any combination
of circumstances will produce a certain result—except by the analogies of past expe-
rience 1’ \Vhat has once happened, will invariably happen again, when the same circum-
stances which combined to produce it, shall again combine in the same way. We all
feel that we know that a blast of wind would extinguish the flame of the candle that
stands by me. How do we know it? We have never seen this flame thus extinguished.
“’0 know it, because we have seen through all our lives, that a blast of wind extin-
guislics the flame of a candle whenever it is thrown fully upon it. Again, we all feel
to know that we have to die. How? \Ve have never died yet. “7e know it, because
we know, or at least think we know, that of all the beings, just like ourselves, who have
been coming into the world for six thousand years, not one is now living who was here
two hundred years ago.

I repeat then, that we know nothing of what will happen in future, but by the analogy
of experience, and that the fair analogy of past experience fully proves that the Sub-
Treasury would be a less safe depository of the public money than a National Bank.
Examine it. By the Sub-Treasury scheme, the public money is to be kept, between the
times of its collection and disbursement, by Treasurers of the Mint, Custom-house offi-
cers, Laud otliccrs. and some new officers to be appointed in the same way that those
first enumerated arc. lfas a year passed since the organization of the Government,
that numerous defalcations have not occurred among this class of officers ‘? Look at
Swartwout with his $1,200,000, Price with his $75,000, Harris with his $109,000, Haw—
kins with his $100000, Linn with his $55,000. together with some twenty-five hundred
lesser lights. Place the public money again in these same hands, and will it not again
go the same way ‘3 Most assuredly it will. But turn to the historv of the National
Bank in this country, and we shall there see, that those Banks performed the fiscal
operations of thc Government thro' a period of 40 years, received, safely kept. trans-
fcrrcd. disbursed, an aggregate of nearly five hundred millions of dollars; and that, in
all that time, and with all that money. not one dollar, nor one cent, did the Government
lose by them. Place the public money again in a similar depository. and will it not
again bc safe? I ’

lint. conclusive as the experience of fifty years is. that individuals are unsafe deposi-
torics of the public money. and of forty years that National Banks are safe depositories,
we are not left to rely solely upon that experience for the truth of those propositions.
If i-xpcricnco were silent upon the subject, conclusive reasons could be shown for the
truth of them.

5

It is often urged, that to say the public money will be more secure in a National
Bank, than in the hands of individuals, as proposed in the Sub-Treasury, is to say,
that Bank directors and Bank officers are more honest than sworn officers of the Gov-
ernment. Not so. We insist on no such thing. We say that public officers, selected
with reference to their capacity and honesty, (which by the way, we deny is the prac-
tice in these days,) stand an equal chance, precisely, of being capable and honest, with
Bank officers selected by the same rule. \Ve further say, that with however much care
selections may be made, there will be some unfaithful and dishonest in both classes.
The experience of the whole world, in all by—gone times, prove this true. The
Saviour of the world chose twelve disciples, and even one of that small number,
selected by superhuman wisdom, turned out a traitor and a devil. And, it may not be
improper here to add, that Judas carried the bag—was the Sub-Treasurer of the Sa—
viour and his disciples. _ .

We then, do not say, nor need we say, to maintain our propos1tion, that Bank Officers
are more honest than Government officers, selected by the same rule. \Vhat we do
say, is, that the interest of the Sub—Treasurer is against his duty—while the interest of
the Bank is on the side of its duty. Take instances—a Sub—Treasurer has in his hands
one hundred thousand dollars of public money; his duty says—“ You ought to pay
this money over ”—but his interest says, “ You ought to run away with this sum, and be
a nabob the balance of your life.” And who that knows anything of human nature,
doubts that, in many instances, interest will prevail over duty, and that the Sub—Treas-
urer will prefer opulent knavery in a foreign land, to honest poverty at home? .But
how different is it with a Bank. Besides the Government money deposited With it, it
is doing business upon a large capital of its own. If it proves faithful to the Govern-
ment, it continues its business; if unfaithful, it forfeits its charter, breaks up its buSi-
ness, and thereby loses more than all it can make by seizing upon the Government
funds in its possession. Its interest, therefore, is on the side of its duty—is to be
faithful to the Government, and consequently, even the dishonest amongst its manag-
ers, have no temptation to be faithless to it. Even if robberies happen In. the Bank,
the losses are borne by the Bank, and the Government loses nothing. It is for this
reason then, that we say a Bank is the more secure. It is because of that admirable
feature in the Bank system, which places the interest and the duty of the (lepOSitory
both on one side; whereas that feature can never enter into the Sub—Treasury system.
By the latter, the interest of the individuals keeping the public money, Will wage an
eternal war with their duty, and in very many instances must be Victorious. In answer
to the argument drawn from the fact that individual depos1tories of public money,
have always proved unsafe, it is urged that even if we 'hada National Bank, the money
has to pass through the same individual hands, that 1t.Wlll under the Sub-Treasury.
This is only partially true in fact, and wholly fallacious in argument. .

It is only partially true, in fact, because by the Sub—Treasury bill, four Receivers
General are to be appointed by the President and Senate. These arenew officers, and
consequently, it cannot be true that the money, or any portion of it, has heretofore
passed thro’ their hands. These four new officers are to be located at .New lork. Bos-
ton, Charleston and St. Louis, and consequently are to be the deposrtories of all the
money collected at or near those points; so that more than three-fourths of the public
money will fall into the keeping of these four new officers, which did not most as oth-
eers under the National Bank system. It is only partially true, then, that the money
passes through the same hands, under a National Bank, as it would do under the Sub-
Treasury. ’ . ‘

It is true, that under either system, individuals must be employed asCollectors of
the Customs, Receivers at the Land Offices, &c. 850. but the difference is, that under
the Bank system, the receivers of all sorts, receive the money and pay it over to the
Bank once a week when the collections are large, and once a month when they are
small, whereas, by the Sub-Treasury system, individuals are. not only to collect the
money, but they are to keep it also, or pay it over to otherindiwduals equally unsafe as
themselves, to be by them kept, until it is wanted for disbursement. It is during the
time that it is thus lying idle in their hands, that opportunity is afforded, and tempt
tation held out to them to embezzle and escape with it. By the Bank system, each
Collector or Receiver, is to deposite in Bank all the money in his hands at the end of
each month at most, and to send the Bank certificates of depos1te, to the Secretary of
the Treasury. Whenever that certificate of deposite fails to arrive at the proper time,
the Secretary knows that the_ofiicers thus failing, is acting the knave; and if he is him-

 

 6

self disposed to do his duty, he has him immediately removed from office, and thereby
cuts him off from the possibility of embezzling but little more than the receipts of a
single month. But by the Sub—Treasury System,-the money is to lie month after
month in the hands of individuals; larger amounts are to accumulate in the hands of
the .{cceivurs General, and some others, by perhaps ten to one, than ever accumulated
in the hands of individuals before; yet during all this time, in relation to this great
stake, the Secretary of the ’llreasury can comparatively know nothing. Reports, to be
sure, he will have, but reports are often false, and always false when made by a knave
to cloak his lcuavery. Long experience has shown, that nothing short of an actual de-
mand of the money will expose an adroit peculator. Ask him for reports and he will
give them to your heart’s content; send agents to examine and count the money in his
hands, and he will borrow of a friend, merely to be counted and then returned, a suf-

ficient sum to make. the sum square. Try what you will, it will all fail till you demand "

the money then, and not till then, the truth will come.

The suin of the whole matter, I take to be this: Under the Bank system, while
sums of money, by the. law, were permitted to lie in the hands of individuals, for very
slim-l purl/uls- only, many and very large defaleations occurred by those individuals.
Under the Sulr'llreusury system, mac/i. larger sums are to lie in the hands of individ-
uals for "HIP/I, long/er periods, thereby multiplying temptation in proportion as the sums
are [wry/Mr: and multiplying opportunity in proportion as the periods are longer to,
and for, those individuals to einbezzle and escape with the public treasure ; and, there-
fore. just in the proportion, that the temptation and the Ipro7'tzmz'ty are greater under
the SthI‘reasui-y than the Bank system, will the pcculations and defalcations be greater
under the former than they have been under the latter. The truth of this, independ-
ent of actual experience, is but little less than self—evident. I therefore, leave it.

But it is said, and truly too, that there is to be a Penitentiary Department to the
Sub‘Treasury. This, the advocates of the system will have it, will bea“/vz'ng-cure-all."
Before I go farther, may I not ask if the Penitentiary Department, is not itself an admis—
sion that they expect the public money to be stolen‘.2 “ihy build the cage if they ex-
peet to catch no birds? But to the question how effectual the Penitentiary will be in
preventing defalcations. How effectual have Penitentiaries heretofore been in prevent-
ing the crimes they were established to suppress? Has not confinement in them
long been the legal penalty of larceny, forgery, robbery, and many other crimes, in
almost all the States 1’ And yet, are not those crimes committed weekly, daily, Day,
and even hourly, in every one of those States ‘! Again, the gallows has long been the
penalty of murder, and yet we scarcely open a newspaper, that does not relate a new
case of that crime. If then, the Penitentiary has ever hereto/‘bre failed to prevent lar-
ceny. forgery and robbery, and the gallows and halter have likewise failed to prevent
murder. by what process of reasoning, I ask, is it that we are to conclude the Peniten—
tiary will llcrcuflcrprevent the stealing of the public money ? But our opponents seem to
think they answer the charge, that the money will be stolen, fully, if they can show
that they will bring the offenders to punishment. Not so. \Vill the punishment of the
thief bring back the stolen money? No more so than the hanging of a murderer restores
his victim to life. “"11th is the object desired '? Certainly not the greatest number of
thieves we can catch, but that the money may not be stolen. If, then, any plan can be
devised for depositing the public treasure, where it will be never stolen, never embez-
zled, is not that the plan to be adopted? Turn, then, to a National Bank, and you
have that plan, fully and completely successful, as tested by the experience of forty
years.

I have now done with the three propositions that the Sub-Treasury would injuriously
affect the currency, and would be more crpcnsivc and less secure as a depository of the
public money than a National Bank. How far I have succeeded in establishing their
truth, is for others to judge.

Omitting, for want of time, what I had intended to say as to the effect of the Sub—
Treasury. to bring the public money under the more immediate control of the Presi-
dent. than it has ever heretofore been, I now only ask the audience, when Mr. Calhoun
shall answer me, to hold him. to 13/20 questions. Permit him not to escape them. Be-
quire him cit/(er to show, that the Sub«Treasury would not injuriously affect the cur-
rency, or that we should in some way. receive an equivalent for that injurious efi‘ect.
Require him either to show that the Sub-Treasury would not be more expensive as a
fiscal agent, than a Bank, or that we should, in some way be compensated for that ad-
ditional expense. And particularly require him to show, that the public money would

 

 

 

7

be as secure in the SubaTreasury as in a. National Bank, or that the additional insecurity
would be overbalanced by some good result of the proposed change.

No one of them, in my humble judgment, will he be able to do; and I venture the pre-
diction, and ask that it may be especially noted, that he will not attempt to answer the
proposition, that the Sub